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Ernesto de Martino’s body of work includes several books on magic (e.g., 1947, 
1959), an impressive historical and comparative anthropological study of funeral 
lamentation (1958), and an ethnography of a South Italian spirit possession cult 
elaborated around the bite of the tarantula and involving the performance of the 
tarantella, a style of music and dance that became popular throughout Italy (1961; 
Lüdtke 2008). At the time of his death in 1965, at the age of fifty-seven, he was 
working on a study of apocalyptic movements, published posthumously with the 
title La fine del mondo (1977). Collections of his shorter writings have appeared in 
Italy, as have publications of his fieldnotes, correspondence, and even his reading 
notes (2005a). Few of these works have been translated, which is part of the reason 
why de Martino is not so well known in the English-speaking world. Perhaps the 
recent translation of his monograph on “tarantism,” The land of remorse (2005b), 
and the appearance of the first book-length study in English of his thought (Ferrari 
2012), will initiate a new appreciation. To these efforts we now add de Martino’s 
account of one of his central and enduring ideas, the “crisis of presence.”  
De Martino’s publications combine social scientific methods and interrogatives 
with deep humanistic learning in philosophy, history, and literature. He illustrates 
his arguments about the “crisis of presence,” for example, with materials drawn 
from Greek tragedy, the Icelandic Poetic Edda, and ethnographic reports from 
Australia. Therein lies a great deal of de Martino’s appeal and power to inspire. 
What has impeded the easy transfer of his ideas into English, however, is his 
assumption that readers comprehend the philosophy of his mentor, Benedetto 
Croce (1866–1952), and are familiar with Italian debates of the 1940s. Even if we 
mastered Croce’s thought—which we do not—there is not space here to explicate 
his complex philosophy of history properly. We can only indicate briefly that 
Croce insisted on presentism, the idea, in Collingwood’s words (1946: 202), that 
“all history is contemporary history.” History depends on the activation of the past 
in a present mind, in relation to contemporary concepts and interests. Historicity, 
                                                 
Translators’ note: We are grateful to the journal Aut Aut for permission to publish this 
translation of “Crisi della presenza e reintegrazione religiosa”, which originally appeared 
in Aut Aut 31 (1956): 17–38. 
| Tobia FARNETTI and Charles STEWART 
2012 | HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (2): 431–33 
432 
for Croce, was human becoming according to the transcendental categories of 
aesthetics, logic, ethics, and economics. Hurricanes and earthquakes do not make 
history; people’s conceptions of such phenomena, and responses to them, do. The 
natural world does not possess the consciousness and reflectivity necessary to 
qualify as participating in history. Unfortunately, and embarrassingly from the 
point of view of anthropology, Croce also excluded “primitive” humans from 
history, as they did not respond to life rationally, but through resort to magic. In 
the article translated here, de Martino can be seen still struggling with his mentor’s 
ideas after his death. Although stating that “Croce was correct,” he nonetheless 
rejects Croce’s divide (taglio) between the human and non-human, but modifies 
the concept of the “divide” to apply to the internal risk within all humans. This is 
the threatening divide between presence and the loss of presence provoked by 
moments of crisis, which negate culture and thus humanity.  
De Martino’s grounding in Croce’s philosophy gives his article an unusual 
orientation and a perplexing vocabulary. This vocabulary may well alienate 
prospective readers, yet it actually produces striking formulations such as “the crisis 
of presence,” which offers a deep anthropological perspective on precarity 
(Saunders 1995). Another novel formulation is de Martino’s idea that in the crisis 
of presence individuals experience “dehistorification.” Since everything is historical, 
losing presence—being cut off from the synthesizing process of historical 
becoming—is equivalent to losing history, or losing society. The anguish 
accompanying the loss of presence may begin to be managed by an even greater 
removal from history through rituals that place one in a timeless metahistory; what 
Eliade termed “illo tempore,” the time before time—archetypal time. Like 
cauterizing a wound, the resort to ritual (or “religious reintegration”) exaggerates 
the initial crisis on the way to healing it. An unfortunate individual falling out of 
history is conscripted, through ritual, into a larger step out of history, which re-
opens the person to values, and enables the reacquisition of everyday historicity.  
De Martino wrote this article in 1956 and at moments it sets off functionalist 
warning bells. He seems to fall into the trap of asserting that individuals 
mechanistically restore themselves to the status quo ante of sanity by resort to 
rituals established precisely for this purpose. Yet, de Martino thinks within a 
historicist paradigm, which assumes dynamism rather than homeostasis. Crises 
arise from the stagnation and fixation of that dynamic power that ordinarily propels 
the individual toward the future. Such moments arise unpredictably, symptoms of 
the human condition, which Heidegger described as “thrownness.” The crisis of 
presence is a momentary failure of the Hegelian synthesis according to which the 
givens of the past and the present should become something novel in the future. 
Reintegration is not a return to a stable cultural norm, but an exercise in creative, 
even revolutionary, power akin to the invention of culture described by Wagner 
(1981). Rather than functionalism, de Martino’s work bears the influences of 
phenomenology and existentialism, schools of thought that long remained outside 
the anthropological purview, but which have begun to be embraced in the last two 
decades. The field of anthropology has thus moved in de Martino’s direction and 
it may well be that nearly a half century after his death we are in a better position to 
understand what he was saying.  
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religious reintegration 
 
 
Ernesto DE MARTINO 
 
Translated from the Italian by  
Tobia Farnetti and Charles Stewart  
 
 
 
The second chapter of my book Il mondo magico (1947) contained the sketch of a 
general theory of magic as a demarcated historical world. Yet it also offered 
something more: an attempt to rethink and test Benedetto Croce’s historicism on 
historiographic
1  
forms of experience which lay outside his scope, namely the 
history of magical and religious life in so-called primitive cultures. Since then, as 
happens so often, new ideas have occurred, and above all, new and more 
contextually detailed historiographic materials have come to light, and these have 
both modified and corroborated that first sketch. It therefore seems an opportune 
moment to return to that discussion at the point where it was abandoned. 
The fundamental thesis of Il mondo magico—which in truth far exceeded the 
historical field of “magic” on which it made its first steps—is the crisis of presence, 
to which magical practices would offer cultural resolution. But in the formulation 
of ten years ago this concept of presence remained tangled in a serious 
contradiction—at least insofar as it pretended to assert itself as a concept of a 
precategorial unity of the person. The conquest of this unity would have 
constituted the dominant problem of the “epoch” of magic. This contradiction did 
not escape Croce who, in his essay, “Intorno al magismo come età storica” (1949) 
[“On magism as historical epoch”] observed:  
On the other hand, De Martino emphasizes the risk of losing oneself, a 
risk that threatens the acquired unity of the spirit as well as its special 
forms. These forms defend themselves against that risk, that is, they 
continuously overcome the negative moment of error, evil, the brutal, 
into the positive moment of truth, beauty, the good, and so on. To 
emphasize this would in effect separate the unity of the spirit from its 
forms with an impossible divide. The forms of the spirit are not added 
onto that unity, but they are the unity itself, and thus trying to consider 
                                                 
1. Since any given culture is the result of historical coming into being, its study was defined 
as historicism by Croce. “Historiography” for de Martino here is equivalent to 
“ethnography.” This usage, repeated in the last paragraph of the article, reveals de 
Martino’s thoroughgoing historicism.—Trans. 
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those in themselves would leave that unity worse than inert, empty. The 
age of magic, then, could not create the unity of the spirit because, like 
all the other ages that we like to carve out of the unique and continuous 
course of history, the age of magic was the action of that unity, and its 
categories. (1949: 202) 
With different emphasis Enzo Paci writes: 
In fact, talk of a drama which, through risk, constructs a vision of the 
world means to consider all of the categories and the forms. If humans 
were exclusively part of nature they would not exist, because they would 
not feel threatened by demise into nothingness, losing the constitutive 
human relationship—the relation between practice and theory; 
economics and moral law; between acting and knowing; between action 
and conscience. The ever-threatening barbarity, Vico’s Lernaean Hydra, 
is really the loss of the categories that constitute humans in their 
historicity. Nature becomes, then, just as in the magical world, diabolical; 
disintegrator of humans and their historical civilization, which, as Vico 
observed, loses its laws, its moral as well as juridical form. (1950: 26) 
Critique of this sort is compelling even if—as I have just shown—Croce and Paci 
present it with different emphases. Croce was correct: the “divide” (il taglio) within 
human history is “impossible” insofar as one could never think of a unity in itself 
that forms a particular—or even dominant—historical problem; a unity 
unconcerned with how and from what it became unity, and which resolution it 
shares in.
2
 
Human civilization and history are always reborn—today as in whatever more 
remote or archaic “then”—and thus they will be born in the future until the word 
“man” makes sense by virtue of the power of categorization according to 
determinate forms or values. Furthermore, cultural presence, that is, being-in-
history (l’esserci nella storia), remains defined precisely by this categorizing energy. 
Nevertheless, within human history, the risk of a divide exists as madness shows. 
At the limits of madness stand exactly that inertia and void—the inertia and void of 
values; presence lost, as Croce noted. Since the relationship that establishes 
presence is the same relationship that makes culture possible, the risk of human 
history not existing takes shape as the risk of losing culture and receding without 
mitigation into nature. When such a risk rises up in a specific “critical” moment of 
historical existence, presence loses the power consciously to define it or overcome 
it, and it gets tangled up, entering into a profound existential contradiction with 
itself. Then presence enters into crisis precisely as presence, since its reality lies 
entirely in the act of defining or overcoming, according to values, the situations of 
its own history (this and nothing else is permissible to understand when one speaks 
of human ex-sistere).3 A radical risk arises then, a risk that is certainly not the loss 
of the mythical prior unity of the categories, but more the loss of the dynamic unity 
of the categories; the extinguishing of that energy of categorization according to 
                                                 
2. An allusion to Hegel’s dialectic, de Martino here conceptualizes the unity of the human 
being itself as the result of a synthesis between opposing forces.—Trans. 
3. The word “exist,” from the Latin roots ex-, “out” and sistere, “to stand,” etymologically 
means “to stand forth, emerge.”—Trans. 
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values, which constitutes the reality itself of being-in-human-history—as Paci rightly 
pointed out. 
The psychic manifestations of the reality of this risk, and of the existential 
contradiction that characterizes it, are found in exemplary form in the very variable 
and empirical nosological classifications of psychiatry. Thus, because of its failure 
to go beyond a certain critical content, presence stands on the verge of further 
becoming, but in a suspended (inattuale) position. The reality of the world appears 
strange, mechanical, sordid, simulated, inconsistent, perverse, dead; and presence 
is felt as lost, dreamy, estranged from itself, and so forth. 
The madman is detached from the present, precisely because he cannot fully 
“be-there” (esserci) in the present, being still anchored or polarized in an 
undecided critical moment of his own personal history, where the chance of any 
overcoming is reduced. Thus the person stands non-dialectically in presence; no 
longer as an instance of conscious awareness, or active memory, but as symptom. 
On the other hand, the unsurpassed content can assert itself by returning as 
uncontrollable psychic estrangement, dressed up in obsessions, phobias, and 
hallucinations, or even converted into certain organic behaviors that fall outside 
conscious control. Furthermore, when there is a risk that a particular critical 
content might not be surmounted, this content may enter presence as an obscure 
anguish of limits. It is as if critical content were asking for its “beyond”—that is 
some formal definition from the surpassing aspect of presence. Because this 
request remains unanswered, or without an adequate response, an unbridled 
allusive tension of content ensues, which can chaotically turn into anything, without, 
however, being able to exhaust the unrestrained allusive impulse (and it cannot do 
so because—for as long as the crisis lasts—the impulse is in itself inexhaustible, 
unable to find the formal, objectivizing, and qualifying definition of presence). 
Without doubt psychopaths attempt to employ specific techniques to defend 
themselves against the risk of their illness, but they fail because they are inadequate. 
Their inadequacy rests in the fact that they do not reestablish the spiritual dialectic. 
That is, they do not retake control of the psychic realities that are alienated, by 
reinserting them in the cultural circuit and redisclosing them to values. The 
“divide” (or trauma) persists, and with the divide, the illness. Among the 
inadequate responses—i.e., those not open to the world of values—one may take, 
for example, delusions of grandeur, in which the madman reacts to the 
extraordinary breadth of obscure callings deriving from the crisis by caricaturing 
himself proportionately. Thus the aggrandizement of self, characteristic of such 
deliriums, takes form. This is exaggeration instead of genius precisely because of 
the miserable feebleness of real values, and for the terrible cultural void that can be 
felt.  
Likewise, melancholic depression, with its monstrous sentiments of blame and 
abjection, contains an inadequate form of interpretive defense, which manifests 
itself precisely in these sentiments. This experience is certainly founded on a 
radical powerlessness of being-there, but so little open to values and history that it 
can sometimes take the form of a naturalistic cycle, that is, a periodic oscillation 
between depression and mania (the so-called manic-depressive psychosis). The 
limit case of inadequate defense is the blocked will of catatonic stupor when all 
possible contents become dangerous and every moment becomes hazardous for 
presence. Then one has the pathological reaction of psychic block, or the 
spasmodic attempt to make oneself the prisoner of a particular content. To 
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maintain this imprisonment, all changes imposed from the outside are rejected up 
to the point of physical exhaustion, as in catalepsy, or repeatedly mirrored, as in 
echolalia or echomimicry. 
 
* * * 
 
At the root of the radical crisis of presence lies the inability to put life (il vitale) into 
dialectic relationship with ethos and logos so that life, in this a-dialectical 
withdrawal, ceases to be a live and vital passion—which drives civilization and 
history—configuring itself instead as mere “suffering,” as impulsivity, parasitic 
representation, inexpiable guilt, and so on. This has been, if not noticed, at least 
glimpsed by some representatives of modern psychiatry. “The entire history of 
madness,” wrote Pierre Janet in 1889, “stems from the weakness of actual synthetic 
power, which is itself moral weakness and psychological misery. Genius, on the 
other hand, is a power of synthesis capable of forming new ideas, which no pre-
existing science could foresee: it is the highest degree of moral potency” (Janet 
1889: 478). 
Here he talks of “moral potency”: and certainly this dialectical power, which 
transforms nature into culture, can truly be considered the fundamental human 
ethos. Animal vitality embraces and nourishes dialectical power in order to open it 
to singular, specific economic, political, juridical, moral, poetic, and scientific 
productions. 
Some psychoanalytic concepts—despite the distortion typical of this 
psychological school—can be taken, allusively at least, to indicate the same 
dialectical relationship. What Freud defines as libido (which he essentially 
considers in the form of sexual vitality) is, in reality, presence. It is the synthetic 
energy that overcomes situations according to distinct faculties of action. When 
Freud talks of the fixation of libido at a particular past stage, assigning to this 
fixation the possibility of neurotic regression, he confirms, within the frame of his 
theory, that mental illness is a critical content that has not been overcome, chosen 
and consciously defined by presence. Without doubt Freud, in conformity with the 
assumptions of his theory, gives decisive importance to the situation of the 
individual’s sexual life, which is ultimately the only crucial thing. Furthermore, he 
interprets fixation as a failed evolution of sexuality. Apart from this limitation, 
which is serious indeed, he nevertheless lets one catch a glimpse of the important 
concept of physical presence as energy that overcomes. Similarly the concept of 
complex suggests an undecided conflict in which presence has remained polarized, 
entering in existential contradiction with itself. Translation and sublimation hint at 
the retrieval and resolution of the conflict in a particular cultural “value”; and so on. 
But we find the most fitting precursor of the concept of crisis of presence not in 
modern psychology, but in Hegel, who on this matter has partly stated, and partly 
implied what is essential. What is here called “presence” corresponds to “self-
feeling” 4 in Hegel, which he defined as follows: 
                                                 
4. A reference to Hegel’s idea of Selbstgefūhl deployed in the passage cited below. It 
refers to the unity of the subject/individual at a level above the registration of different 
sensations, yet below the level of consciousness: a precognitive unification of 
sensations.—Trans. 
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The feeling totality, as individuality, is essentially this: distinguishing itself 
within itself, and awakening to the judgment within itself, in virtue of 
which it has particular feelings and stands as a subject in respect of these 
determinations of itself. The subject as such posits them within itself as 
its feelings. It is immersed in this particularity of sensations, and at the 
same time, through the ideality of the particular, in them it joins together 
with itself as a subjective unit. In this way it is self-feeling—and yet it is 
only in the particular feeling. (Hegel 2007: 114; § 407)5 
Now, the subject as self-feeling can be susceptible to illness; that is “to the disease 
of remaining fast in a particularity of its self-feeling, unable to refine it to ideality 
and overcome it” (Hegel 2007: 114; § 408). Here the risk of presence is posed 
with utmost clarity as the impossibility of overcoming one of its particular 
contents—that is to define it according to distinct forms of cultural coherence. For 
Hegel the physical subject is the being-itself (il se stesso) as coherent or rational 
consciousness. The pathological subject is this being-itself as prisoner of a 
particular content: 
The fully furnished self of intellectual consciousness is the subject as an 
internally consistent consciousness, which orders and conducts itself in 
accordance with its individual position and its connection with the 
likewise internally ordered external world. But when it remains ensnared 
in a particular determinacy, it fails to assign that content the intelligible 
place and the subordinate position belonging to it in the individual 
world-system which a subject is. In this way the subject finds itself in the 
contradiction between its totality systematized in its consciousness, and 
the particular determinacy in that consciousness, which is not pliable and 
integrated into an overarching order. This is derangement. (Hegel 2007: 
114–15; § 408) 
Obviously the limitations of the Hegelian self-feeling are the limitations and defects 
of Hegelian dialectics itself. The totality of the subject is not here the distinction of 
cultural forms, but still rational consciousness, understood as simple judgment in 
itself and as the referral of its feelings to itself: where it concerns the synthetic 
power through categories of action, or the unity-distinction of this faculty. However, 
aside from this limitation, Hegel understands with extraordinary acuity the 
substance of what I am calling “crisis of presence.” When Hegel states that the 
spirit is free and thus not susceptible to illness—while self-feeling can fall into a 
contradiction between its subjectivity, which in itself is free, and a particularity, 
which does not then become ideal but remains stuck in self-feeling—he is hinting at 
the idea that the spirit, that is the presence engaged in the categorization of cultural 
forms, is physical presence. On the other hand, the presence which does not push 
its contents over into the ideality of form is necessarily an ill presence, which is 
losing itself.  
When Hegel claims that the old metaphysical concept of spirit (spirito) as soul 
(anima) is in truth the idea of the spirit as susceptible to madness (for if the soul-
substance should only exist as natural and fastened in existential finitude, this is 
indeed the concept of madness), he expresses, in the language of his system, the 
                                                 
5. Hegel, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Science, Pt. 3, Philosophy of Mind,  § 407. 
Translated from the German by W. Wallace and A. V. Miller (2007: 114).—Trans. 
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idea that being-there is the generative synthetic energy of cultural dialectic, and that 
when being-there is reduced to mere natural existence the catastrophe of cultural 
life, human freedom and history occurs: 
But in earlier metaphysics it was regarded as soul, as a thing; and only as 
a thing, i.e. as something natural and in being, is it liable to derangement, 
to the finitude lodged in it. . . . The mind that is determined as merely 
being, in so far as such being is un-dissolved in its consciousness, is 
diseased. (Hegel 2007: 115; § 408) 
The spirit as being which exists only partially, and that stands in consciousness 
without resolution, is presence fixated or entangled in one of its contents, and thus 
not present anymore. This is because going beyond its contents is the very 
definition of presence. Moreover, being without resolution signals content that 
remains unmediated and undefined by cultural values, and it fails to become 
determinable content, but returns as untamable symptom, as tyrannical extraneity. 
But there is more: madness as spirit becoming nature is precisely the risk of not 
being-there as presence, of not being-there in a human history, that is of receding 
onto the level of nature, where presence does not have a place. Here we reach the 
supreme existential alternatives: either healthy presence that opens itself up to the 
works and days of human culture; or ill presence that loses both itself and the 
world and plunges into madness.  
However, Hegel himself highlights in a passage of his Encyclopaedia (Hegel 
2007: 114–30; § 408) that the disease attacking “self-feeling” does not arise without 
opposition and resistance on the part of the sick person, and that alienation is not 
an abstract loss of reason, but a contradiction within reason itself. That is, the crisis 
of presence is a crisis inasmuch as it is perceived as risk—even as the ultimate risk, 
the destruction of what is human. In fact, the ultimate risk of presence is 
accompanied—at least as far as presence resists it—by a total reaction, which is 
anguish. If we purge this idea of all irrelevant interpretations nourished by the 
abstractions of metaphysics—from cryptogamy 6  with the immediacy of religious 
experience or even from moral inertia or latent morbidities—and if at the same 
time we refrain from falling into the easy empiricisms of psychopathology, we find 
that anguish is a reaction of presence in the face of the risk of not being able to 
overcome critical contents, and of feeling oneself headed for supreme abdication. 
In other words anguish is the risk of losing the very possibility of deploying the 
formal energy of being-there. 
Anguish signposts the attack on the very roots of human presence, the 
alienation of oneself from oneself, culture’s plunge into nature. Anguish underlines 
the risk of losing the distinction between subject and object, between thought and 
action, representation and judgment, vitality and morality—it is the scream of 
someone tottering on the edge of the abyss. It is because presence, in its radical 
crisis, can no longer make itself present to historical process, and is losing the 
ability of being the meaning and norm of this process, that anguish can correctly be 
interpreted as anguish at history, or better as anguish over not being-there in a 
human history. When it is maintained that anguish is never anguish over 
something, but over nothing, the proposition is acceptable, but only in the sense 
that here it is not the loss of this or that which is at stake, but the very possibility of 
                                                 
6. A de Martino solecism, apparently meaning a hidden bond or linkage.—Trans. 
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the what as formal energy. Such loss or annihilation is not absolute nothingness, 
but the nothingness of presence. It is not not-being, but not-being-there—the 
destruction of cultural life and human history. 
This fundamental characteristic of anguish is occasionally visible in 
psychopathological treatises, despite their empiricism. “The sick person does not 
feel anguish at some thing, they are anguish, without awareness of either an object 
or a subject.” “The object is the ordered use of excitation, and the consciousness 
of the self is the necessary completion of the awareness of the object. However in 
the catastrophic laceration of anguish there is no object, and hence anguish is 
without content and definite awareness of the self.” “What the sick person 
undergoes is the laceration of the structure of the personality. One cannot even say 
that they are feeling anguish, they are anguish and become one with it in this 
unspeakable tumult in which subject and object disappear.” “Anguish is the 
ultimate danger, that is the approach of that final stage in which the organism 
cannot adapt to the environment, and it is threatened in its very existence.” These 
propositions by Kurt Goldstein (1929), though inadequate for their empiricism, 
find clarification and truth in the conception of anguish as a total reaction to the 
radical risk of the loss of presence. What indeed can the loss of distinction 
between subject and object mean, that immediate rise of anguish, that laceration in 
the structure of personality, that unutterable overthrowing that carries with it the 
essential risk of not being able to adapt to one’s surroundings? What can that 
feeling “in seine Existenz bedroth”7 mean if not the destruction of being-there in 
the sense we have clarified? Freud’s conception of anguish, on the other hand, is 
far less useful for orientation, entangled as it is with the dubious concepts of 
“libido” and “repression.”8 
 
* * * 
 
If this is the nature of the crisis of presence then what is its relation to religious 
experience, the domain of the sacred? In general two antagonistic positions are 
taken: either one denies that there could ever be an essential relation between the 
risk of pathological alienation and the sacred, or one passes—albeit with different 
temperaments, nuances and cautions—to the extreme opposite with the 
preposterous result of confounding religion with madness (rarely does anyone state 
this explicitly, but too often the distinction between the two rests solely on good 
intentions). The supporters of the first thesis—who often belong to a particular 
faith—point to the ethical and speculative values in which world religions are rich, 
and which in smaller measure are also found in more elementary religions. And it 
is easy for them to say that the madman is mad, while modern civilization was born 
from the “delirium” of Christ or the “epilepsy” of Paul.  
On the other hand, psychiatrists are naturally inclined to favor the connection 
between alienation and religious life, so frequently do they professionally 
encounter the “supernatural” and the “gods” among the mentally ill. Nonetheless, 
                                                 
7. Having one’s existence threatened.—Trans. 
8. For an overview of the different conceptions of anguish in modern psychiatry (and in 
existentialism) see Boutonier (1949).  
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the connection is unclear. In reading the book of Georges Dumas on this topic, for 
example, one is left perplexed over the difference between the “pathological 
theogenesis” about which the author writes, and the ordinary theogenesis of the 
great civilizations of history (Dumas 1946).
9
 Actually there is a relationship between 
the risk of pathological alienation and religious life and not in the banal sense that 
“sometimes” or “accidentally” whoever is engaged in the experience of the sacred 
could “go out of his mind,” but really as a dialectical relationship between risk of 
crisis and religious techniques of reintegration; in the sense that through the 
mediation of such techniques recovery is facilitated and one’s operative powers are 
redisclosed according to forms and values, whose exercise the crisis had 
compromised.  
To illustrate the dialectical character of the relationship between pathological 
breakdown and religious life we can take for example a work which has had, in the 
last forty years or so, a notable influence in the areas of philosophy and history of 
religions: Rudolf Otto’s, The idea of the holy (1950). It is a theological work, yet 
nonetheless, for this very reason, it can offer some valuable insights. Obviously on 
one condition: that the problematic begins for us there where Otto considers that 
he has reached the edge of the known world, namely the vivid experience of the 
numinous that is present. The characteristic connotation, profoundly irrational, of 
this presence would be—according to Otto—the “radical other” (ganz Andere); 
whence the “blind horror” (blinde Entsetzen), the “demonic awe” (dämonische 
Scheu), which take hold of and subjugate the poor creature. Now this “radically 
other,” which unnerves whoever experiences it, is precisely the “radical” risk of not 
being-there; the alienation which threatens to set it in motion toward its exact 
pathological meaning, the catastrophe that presence must resist with all its powers. 
Profane (or ordinary) alterity is always relative, inserted into the formal circuit and 
qualified. But when it starts to become “eccentric,” isolated, and presence feels 
itself enmeshed in this tremendous temptation to abdicate, then that “radically” 
other also begins to appear, which can be interpreted as the terrifying signal of 
pathological alienation. Blinde Entsetzen is also eloquent: entsetzen has the double 
meaning of “to dispossess” and “to horrify.” What it means is that here is about to 
be consummated the loss, not of “this” or “that,” but of the very same formal 
                                                 
9. By way of example, consider the following passage: “It is because the gods of our 
illnesses are most often personal that they are limited in omniscience, action and 
ubiquity. For this same reason they are not so much spiritual agents as counterparts of 
the ill person and to the degree that they are nothing other than private gods these ill 
persons are not to be conflated with the faithful followers of a religion” (Dumas 1946: 
321). Now the history of religions, especially primitive religions, knows a great number 
of strictly private and personal numinous entities with limited powers (one thinks of the 
nagual and of certain forms of the tijurunga). This does not allow one, however, within 
the respective historical contexts, to speak of “pathological theogenesis.” If, however, 
we take the word “private” in this passage of Dumas as meaning “not immediately open 
to the shared values of the given historical context” then one obtains a valid criterion for 
discriminating between “pathological” and “ordinary theogenesis.” For specialist works 
on the psychopathology of religion over the past fifty years, see: Murisier (1909); Moses 
(1906); Birnbaum (1920); Oesterreich (1922); Schneider (1929); Storch (1930); and 
Janet (1926, 1930). To this list should be added these works from a psychoanalytical 
perspective: Freud (1907, 1913); Reik (1928); and Rank (1919). For the Zurich school: 
Jung (1942). 
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energy of “which.” It is in fact from such radical dispossession that the 
characteristic horror that individuates crisis is born. However, the dialectical 
character of the relationship crisis–recovery in the experience of the sacred is 
illustrated very clearly by the expression dämonische Scheu. In fact, if the 
emphasis falls on Scheu one has something practically identical to a state of anxiety, 
to pathological blinde Entsetzen. However, if the accent falls on dämonische then 
recovery is already beginning to make inroads, even if in a very elementary way, 
and horror will no longer be “blind” if it at least can glimpse a demonic image, 
which is part of a mythico-religious cultural tradition organically inserted into the 
historical world in which one lives.  
Similar considerations may be made with regard to the other moment of the 
“numinous,” the fascinans, which is inseparable from the tremendum. 10  The 
paradoxical character of this polarity does not constitute in the least a mysterious 
nexus—that one may only relive in its immediacy, or stimulate and suggest through 
the selection of fitting words—but it contains a transparent dialectic. That which in 
the crisis repels and subjugates, namely the tremendum of presence becoming 
alienated and lost, nonetheless attracts and calls into relationship, to recovery and 
to reintegration. This attraction, or irresistible call, is the fascinans of the “radically 
other.” In the limitation of religious experience that which calls is the numinous, 
but for critical thought that which calls is the alienation of presence asking for 
reintegration into human history.  
This characteristic dialecticity reveals the integral historicity of the hieropoetic
11
 
process. The risk of losing human history takes place within human history itself, 
and it cannot have any hieropoetic meaning without this reference to the concrete. 
Now, to say “history” means, in the first place, to say “society,” that is—at least for 
human societies—a mode of collective organization for the technical domination of 
nature; in order for society to be disclosed to law and ethics, poetry and science. 
The measurement of real being-there in human history cannot leave out the first 
step of mediation, that is, the consideration of a socio-economic regime 
determined in a certain way. If the technical sphere is poor and elementary, if 
nature dwarfs it with its excessive power; and if retrospection is narrow and 
prospective consciousness of effective behaviors for the dominion over natural 
forces is limited; if in the interior of human society particular groups stand like 
“nature” in relation to certain others—that is lowered to a function which is merely 
technical and instrumental—then, for these very reasons, the limitation and fragility 
of presence as the free power to surmount situations arises, and the risk of radical 
alienation becomes huge. In this diffuse atmosphere of existential precariousness 
the process of becoming is punctuated by moments of crisis in which historicity 
“protrudes” (sporge) and presence risks not being-there. However, even here, the 
quantity, quality, and degree of risk in such moments, is not definable in a single 
way, for these matters are determined differently depending on the structure of the 
society. A people who live by hunting and gathering, and who have not gone 
beyond the fashioning of basic implements out of stone does not have the same 
crisis moments as a society founded on cultivation by the hoe, or one that practices 
                                                 
10. A reference to Otto’s description of the numinous as “mysterium tremendum et 
fascinans.”—Trans. 
11. A neologism meaning “sacred-making.”—Trans. 
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pastoral nomadism, or one that might have come to variably combine these modes 
of primitive economy rising up to the invention of the plough and the cultivation of 
grains, or one which may have passed through the various stages of industrial 
evolution up to the invention of machinery. Even in such a society with profound 
social stratification moments of crisis are not articulated in the same way in each 
stratum of the hierarchical organization.  
Religious reintegration, however, is historical also in another sense because it 
takes very different forms even on the level of reintegration itself. In general, the 
hieropoetic process is to be interpreted as the choice of exemplary critical 
moments and as a technique—or system of techniques—for facing the risk of 
alienation and re-disclosing those formal powers which crisis threatens to paralyze. 
It is as if a part—in some given societies an enormous part—of the technical power 
of man were diverted from its use for the domination of natural forces by means of 
the economic organization of society and the manipulation of certain material or 
mental instruments, to find its application in the task of restoring an horizon to 
presence, and of preventing—in critical moments—the same fundamental power 
from which culture and human history come forth from being naturalized. The 
fundamental trait of religious reintegration is this technique of institutional de-
historification.  
From the weave of becoming arises a series of critical moments, of exemplary 
character for the existential regime here in question. These are moments which, 
for various reasons, represent “passages” par excellence, during which one is 
particularly caught up in being-there, and precisely because of this they can cause 
an increased risk of radical alienation. These passages are dehistorified, that is, 
they are resolved—masked and protected—in the repetition of the identical; and in 
the end as if they were not new (or historical), but as if they were repeating an 
archetypal situation, which has already taken place in metahistory. In such guise, 
through the pious fraud of this “already” guaranteed on the level of metahistory, 
the “here” and the “now” of history is redisclosed, and presence regains—in varying 
degrees of awareness and cultural potential—the plenitude of its own formal 
horizons.
12
 
Consider, by way of example, an important aspect of the myth of the “center” 
among the Achilpa, a totemic clan of the Aranda people (Central Australia). The 
Aranda are semi-nomadic hunter-gatherers, and this means that for such a group, 
forced in its ancient migrations to cross, for their livelihood, new territories, the 
historical emergence of this crossing must acquire particular prominence. The 
crisis, which is directly documented ethnologically, here takes the form of a 
“territorial anxiety,” which has its corresponding pathology in specific forms of 
dromophobia (and possibly also of agoraphobia). The Achilpa myth clearly reflects 
the process of religious dehistorification. There is a center of the “world” where 
the task of shaping the territory was performed by the mythical ancestor according 
to a relation of repetition, in the sense that the territory constituted, for each of its 
temporary dwellings, a reiteration of the mythical center. During migrations from 
South to North, Achilpa groups carry the center of the world with them, 
represented by a pole, and at every stopping place they plant the pole and 
                                                 
12. For the discussion of this thesis in polemical dialogue with the “phenomenology of 
religion” of G. van der Leeuw, see de Martino (1953–54). 
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celebrate the ceremony, which repeats the myth. In this way, the historicity of the 
crossing gets concealed. The act of walking becomes permanence at the center, 
and meanwhile—within such dehistorification—truly disclosed. The myth narrates 
that when the post broke during the migration, and the ritual of reiteration of the 
archetypal center could no longer be performed, the Achilpa groups could no 
longer continue their peregrinations, and they let themselves fall to the ground, 
crowding together in anticipation of death.
13
 
The analysis of the modus operandi of the technique of religious de-
historification is of considerable interest. A ritual presence comes to be instituted, 
with a reiterative, impersonal, and dreamy character. Such a presence, in which 
everything tends to become stereotypical and traditional, is technically suited to 
both trigger descent (catabasi) toward psychic realities at risk of alienation, or to 
start the ascent (anabasi) toward values. Ritual (or mythico-ritual) presence is thus 
to be understood as a presence that works under a regime of “saving” (risparmio), 
that tends to restore the balance that has started to tip toward failure. On the other 
hand, the ethics and rationality which, under the protection of such a regime, attain 
freedom, continually act on myth and ritual. They permeate them with their 
substance, humanize religions more and more and engrain values within 
techniques that raise the rite to cult, sacrifice, and prayer, and the demonic to the 
divine, and the myth to mental formations in which morality and law, poetry and 
science shine forth—to the point where values, having broken the technical 
mythico-ritual protection, begin to assert themselves in consciousness proper as 
such, in their human interiority and autonomy.  
Let us consider, for example, the lament as an important moment of funeral 
rituals in antiquity. Here the initial crisis appears in its grandeur: we find typically 
pathological manifestations, such as Gudhrun’s melancholic inaction before the 
corpse of Sigfried in the first lay of Gudhrun in the Eddas, or as the “fury” of 
Achilles in the eighteenth book of the Iliad, when Antilochus holds the hands of 
the hero for fear he might cut his throat with his sword [upon hearing the news of 
Patroclus’ death], or like the desperation of David at the death of Saul (“grabbing 
at his clothes he tore them off, and so did all those present”); and we also find the 
blinde Entsetzen before the corpse, and that dämonische Sheu which makes 
Apollo say in Euripides’ Alcestis: “But I, for fear pollution overtake me in the 
house, am leaving the shelter of this roof I love so well, for already I see death 
hard by.”14 But at the same time, at the other end of the process, we encounter the 
rhythmic cadence of ritual lamentation, in lament in the context of the cult of 
heroes, or in the Egyptian funeral lament that repeats for every deceased—who is 
an Osiris—the mythical lamentation of Isis and Nephthys. Finally, we encounter it 
in the religious complexity of the lamentations of Jeremiah. Furthermore, on 
Greek soil, already beyond ritual and myth, we come to the Homeric funeral 
                                                 
13. For the demonstration of this thesis and the relevant documentation see de Martino 
(1951–52). 
14. Ll. 22ff. Apollo is speaking about the impending murder of Alcestis by her husband 
Admetus. E. P. Coleridge translation of the Ancient Greek (Euripides 1920).—Trans. 
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lament (goos), the choral lament of tragedy (kommos), and lyric threnody 
(threnos).15 
Moral, political and poetic values are then reached. The process that led from 
the dissipation of madness to the liberation of those values took place, in the 
ancient world, through the mediation of lament, as a recovery technique. “Get 
away from the graves!” warned Goethe, and the lament enables that with its own 
suitable techniques. It is worth lingering over the modus operandi of such 
technique. The chaotic planctus 16 of the crisis is transformed into a ritual planctus 
in which alienated psychic realities (melancholic inaction, self-harming impulses, 
and the like) are rediscovered, retrieved, and concentrated in the hypnoid state of 
the ritual presence of lament. In such a state, these psychic realities are disciplined 
according to an anonymous and dreamy “measure”; in the “this-is-how-one-
mourns” stereotype of tradition. At the same time one has mythical mastery over 
another psychic reality in alienation, the image of the corpse. At the most basic 
level such elaboration does not proceed beyond the ghoulishness of the deceased, 
and this moment is reflected in ritual in a series of techniques of separation, so that 
the deceased is appeased and does not return as a ghost, that is, as an unrelated 
psychic externality. The ritualized planctus is hence filled with meanings: it is 
necessary to show the extent of grief to the deceased; quench their thirst for blood 
and life; shout to scare them and convince them to leave for their new residence; 
disfigure one’s own appearance to escape their gaze; and so on. At a higher level, 
moral values are liberated. The same separating gestures can acquire moral value: 
mourning becomes the Homeric tribute owed to the deceased (geras thanonton); 
and the laceration of cheeks to the point of bloodshed (“ut sanguine ostenso inferis 
satisfaciant”) 17  is softened in the order (kosmos) restored by the living, as in 
Euripides’ Suppliants: “Come, you who join the mourners’ wail, come, O 
sympathetic band, to join the dance, which Hades honors; let the white nail be 
stained red, as it rends your cheeks, let your skin be streaked with gore; for honors 
rendered to the dead are an ornament (kosmos) to the living.”18 
At an even higher and more complex level, which finds its expression in the 
religious life connected to the Osiris cycle, the generic “this-is-how-one-mourns” of 
the ritual dehistorification is transformed into the repetition of ritual: every 
deceased is an Osiris, having like him died and been resurrected, and every 
lamentation reiterates the mythical mourning of Isis and Nephthys. The whole 
technique of lamentation is directed toward the facilitation of the recovery of 
presence: hence a regulation for mourning is instituted—the Homeric leader of the 
dirge (exarchos gooio)—which periodizes the planctus in relatively regular intervals, 
and reshapes it in emotive refrains, so that between refrains the necessary horizon 
                                                 
15. On these relations see Reiner (1938). In particular, for the relation between funerary 
ritual lamentation and tragedy, see Nilsson (1951: 61ff.).  
16. The Latin word for mourning, which includes acts of self-injury such as beating the 
breast or tearing one’s hair in addition to wailing.—Trans. 
17. A reference to the Latin author Varro who reported this as a funerary practice. Cp. 
Leviticus 19, 28: “You shall not make any cuttings in your flesh for the dead.”—Trans. 
18. Euripides (1938), Suppliants, ll. 71–79. Translated from Ancient Greek by E. P. 
Coleridge.—Trans. 
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for the inauguration of the rhythmic discourse of authentic lamentation can be 
restored to presence. The emotive refrains are divided between leader and chorus, 
or even ceded by the leader to the chorus, establishing a collective assistance in 
overcoming the most hazardous critical moments. Finally, for the rhythmic logos 
of lamentation, particular precautions are also effective for disclosing presence, that 
is the repetition of gestural, literary, and melodic stereotypes set by tradition. This 
ritual logos is, then, a protected discourse, that allows one to reach—to the extent to 
which one is able—the personal “variation,” the reemergence of the historical 
situation, the resolution of “dying” into “this death” and of “mourning” into “this 
mourning of mine”; the redisclosure of the ethos of memories and sentiments, and 
sometimes even a glimmer of poetry. 
In the aforementioned first lay of Gudhrun the scene of the lamentation 
appears in the reelaboration of the epic, and hence already far beyond its real 
ritual form with all its mythical moments. Yet, the technical function of ritual is still 
apparent. Beside the corpse of the murdered king, Gudhrun lies still, dry-eyed, 
stiffened in a sort of melancholic inaction or stupefied lethargy: 
Then did Guthrun think to die, / When she by Sigurth sorrowing 
sat; / Tears she had not, nor wrung her hands, / Nor ever wailed, as 
other women. / To her the warriors wise there came, / Longing her 
heavy woe to lighten; / Grieving could not Guthrun weep, / So sad her 
heart, it seemed, would break. (Bellows 1926: 412, st. 1–2) 
In vain the princes’ noble wives try to induce her into lamentation each narrating 
her own misfortunes. Gudhrun stubbornly refuses to enter into the ritual event that 
would mediate recovery, and remains trapped in her melancholic inaction. Then 
Gullrond commands the unveiling of the king’s corpse, and sets the traditional 
cushion for the lamentation beneath her knees: 
The shroud she lifted from Sigurth, laying / his well-loved head on the 
knees of his wife: / “look on thy loved one, and lay thy lips / to his as if 
yet the hero lived . . . ” (Bellows 1926: 415, st. 12) 
Gudhrun pulls herself together, and breaks the painful spell of her “polarization,” 
and comes alive to the task of overcoming the situation; but such recovery is 
accomplished through the mediation of ritual, that is by undertaking a series of 
traditional gestures and behaviors; by following, that is, what “one does” when “one 
needs” to lament the dead: 
Once alone did Guthrun look; / his hair all clotted with blood 
beheld, / the blinded eyes that once shone bright, / the hero’s breast 
that the blade had pierced. / Then Guthrun bent, on her pillow 
bowed, / her hair was loosened, her cheek was hot, / and the tears like 
raindrops downward ran . . . ” (Bellows 1926: 415–16, st. 13–14) 
Gudhrun’s planctus is not an isolated crisis, for it is progressively disciplined in the 
stereotypical patterns of ritual and the meanings of myth (although such meanings 
are lost in the mythical reelaboration of the Edda). Within the protective 
safeguards of the ritualized and mythicized planctus, Gudhrun will finally be 
reborn into the ethos of memories and sentiments, and attempt to widen in the 
rhythmic discourse of lamentation her own sorrow which becomes human once 
again: 
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So was my Sigurth o’er Gjuki’s sons / as the spear-leek grown above the 
grass, / or the jewel bright borne on the band, / the precious stone that 
princes wear. / To the leader of men I loftier seemed / and higher 
than all of Herjan’s maids; / as little now as the leaf I am / on the 
willow hanging; my hero is dead.” (Bellows 1926: 416–17, st. 17–18) 
In this technical framework of ancient ritual lamentation a number of further 
“comfortable” operations become possible, such as allowing a professional 
mourner to lead the lamentation or its repetition according to a ritual calendar, so 
that there is a day or even an hour for mourning, potentially leaving one free in the 
intervals from any demands. This produces a concentration of mourning in the 
corresponding ritual presence, which can be invoked or suspended as needed. On 
the other hand the repetition of the lamentation in successive moments permits 
another technical opportunity, to face the psychic realities in alienation not only in 
their “protected” form, but also in successively reduced doses, divided according to 
the phases of the ritual calendar. 
 
* * * 
 
Let us go back now, for a moment, to the starting point of this discussion, that is to 
Il mondo magico. Evidently magic as well, like religion, is a reintegrative technique 
grounded upon dehistorification, and the only difference is in the degree of 
awareness with which “values” are rediscovered, reenacting themselves in the 
experience of the sacred. Where this awareness is minimal, and the technique 
acquires predominant control subjectively, we find magic. Where, on the other 
hand, the ascent toward ethos and logos reshapes deeply the initial risk of 
alienation, it is rightly established linguistic custom to use the word “religion.” 
So, for example, the demonic terror of the dead, and the ritual techniques 
aimed at separating the dead from the living, constitute a technical-magical 
moment, for here the risk of crisis is still very close to its immediacy, and the ritual 
of separation can be—only through bold dialectic extrapolation by the historian—
interpreted as the first glimmer of that ethos which finds its truth in Goethe’s: “Get 
away from the graves!” If, on the other hand, in ritual, moments pertinent to the 
“dear memory” of the deceased, to the cult of this memory, to the recurring need 
of regaining energy and comfort from their deeds (think of Foscolo’s “hence shall 
we draw the auspices” (Foscolo [1962] 2002: 24, ll. 181–2), become prominent, 
then the designation of religious experience seems to be more appropriate. 
Beyond this difference in degree it is not possible to introduce any other difference 
between magic and religion, and any form of magic, however elementary or 
unrefined, is dialectically open to values. Furthermore, any “religious” experience, 
however elevated and complex, has its own technical-magical moment, or mythical-
ritualistic moment, within which reintegration becomes viable. Hence “Christian” 
ethos, poetry, art, and philosophy take place within the great myth of Christ and 
the solemn ritual of the breaking of the bread, and they have been delivered to 
civilization and history under the aegis of the great dehistorifying technique, of the 
dramatic “regime of saving,” according to which the good news has already been 
announced once, and the becoming of history can be periodically solved in the 
ritual reenactment and repetition of the sacrifice of the human-God, so that the 
promised Kingdom already begins—every time—in the ritual. 
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This line of thought allows us to rediscover the truth of another point stressed 
by Croce regarding my book of ten years or so ago: namely that the sorcerer as 
“redeemer” is in the end “on the same level as the redeemed” and “struggles in the 
same sick and blind vitality that, by twisting about on the bed, for a moment 
escapes the pain” (Croce 1949: 203).19 This observation is acceptable insofar as, in 
my book, the dialectic sense of the relationship between “magical” techniques and 
“openness toward values” was missing, and there was a tendency to consider such 
techniques as intrinsically and independently salvific, even if only in their own 
historic world. It is now clear that magico-religious techniques do not save if they 
do not open to values, if they cannot be historiographically reconstructed as 
economic moments that aid ascent:
20
 it is likewise true that in mental illness there 
are technical attempts to defend oneself, which simulate magic or religion, but 
which are not one or the other, precisely because the ascent is incomplete, and the 
“divide” (or trauma) that makes them sick remains. 
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